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Abstract 
 This thesis provides an analysis of the process of revolution that occurred in Egypt 
starting in January 2011 and its impact on Egyptian-Israeli relations.  After the process of 
revolution is examined, a detailed account of the various regime changes that occurred over 
the next 4 years is provided. After these regime changes are detailed, the foreign policy 
decisions of Israel and the various Egyptian regimes are examined.  This analysis culminates 
in a prediction for Egypt’s future.  A major finding of this thesis is that Egypt underwent a 
revolution to remove an oppressive regime to only go through years of violence, protest, and 
at some times anarchy, to have a regime remarkably similar to the one they wished to 
remove.  The other main finding of this analysis is that Egyptian-Israeli relations changed 
drastically with regime change, but was always considered by the new regimes.    
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Part I: Introduction and Causes for Revolution 
For a long time, there have been tensions between Egypt and Israel, but over the last 
few decades, there has been a tenuous peace between the two neighbors.  In January 2011, 
Egypt faced waves of protests that caused substantial change in the regime.  There were 
several regime changes over the following months, and each affected relations with Israel.  
Egypt’s current political climate is unstable, and many are speculating on what will occur 
next.  The continued changes in Egyptian politics have put strains on Egyptian-Israeli 
relations, particularly with the new president, Sisi, and renewed hatred for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, by the regime itself.   
In the following examination of post-revolutionary change in Egypt, the causes for 
revolution will be outlined, including the elements of dissatisfaction with the regime 
primarily by the youth, economic disparity, the role of technology, and Mubarak’s oppressive 
policies and unpopular foreign policy.  Next, the process of revolution will be detailed 
examining how Mubarak fell from power.  Following this, the various regime changes will 
be analyzed in order to understand the turmoil that Egypt endured.  Then, the changes in 
foreign policy, specifically with Israel will be discussed to understand how Egypt and Israel’s 
relationship has changed and evolved with the changes in Egypt’s government.  The 
conclusion will discuss future predictions for the once strong nation of Egypt.   
The Arab Spring caused many changes in the Arab World, and Egypt was affected 
profoundly.  The people of Egypt, while diverse, generally were discontent with their 
government, saw no hope for the future, and decided it was time to change.  They overthrew 
an oppressive leader, only to be confronted with a well-organized Islamist government that 
did not espouse the same rights that the protestors fought for.  This government was short-
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lived, due to a coup d’état, that ushered in a new government reflective of the one Egyptians 
attempted to remove with Mubarak.  Egypt’s government changed rapidly in four years only 
to bring in a ruler very similar to the oppressor that Egyptians had endeavored to remove. 
 Uprisings in Tunisia and the ousting of Ben Ali were seen as the spark that ignited 
change in Egypt.  However, there were many other factors influencing the Egyptian people.  
According to Barrington Moore, in his studies of revolution, “experience of hardship alone 
does not move people to resist. To shift from misery to a mass movement, people must first 
discover ‘moral anger and a sense of social injustice’” (Moore, 15).  This was especially true 
in Egypt, specifically in regard to socioeconomic class disparity.  Prior to the revolution, 
Egypt was seen as a stable government in the region by Western and foreign actors; however, 
this perception was not the reality.  Due to this perception of a stable government, Egypt 
experienced a large amount of economic growth in the 15 years prior to revolution; however, 
the wealth was only distributed to a select few, including the military, entrepreneurs, and 
business owners (Gallup).   
 The first primary cause of revolution was the deterioration of the relationship between 
Egypt’s government and its citizens.  As the Egyptian citizens experienced their country 
deteriorating, they became demoralized and discontented with the regime.  While many 
might have tolerated a paternal state-citizen social contract, where people accept less 
freedom in exchange for high-quality state-provided social services, Egyptians were deprived 
of both. As Egyptian citizens’ personal freedom decreased, their satisfaction with state-
provided necessities declined. This twin decline in attitudes suggests that in the eyes of many 
Egyptians the old regime had resembled more an oppressor rather than a generous, if 
overprotective, guardian.  Egypt’s GDP was rising throughout the early 2000s, however the 
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citizens continued to be deprived of opportunities.  Egypt’s government supported 
entrepreneurs and rich business owners and the military.  These individuals claimed they had 
access to a skilled workforce, however, Egypt’s unemployment continued to rise.  The IMF 
reported that, in 2010, the youth unemployment rate was 25% (Gallup). 
   The main demographic group that had the most influence on the uprisings in Egypt 
was the youth.  Egypt’s demographics provided a foundation for change.  According to 
Duncan Green, of The Guardian,  
Consider the demographics: an explosive mix of high population growth, leading to a 
"youth bulge", combined with urbanisation, jobless growth partly linked to structural 
adjustment, and the rapid expansion of university education has produced what the 
BBC's Paul Mason calls "a new sociological type, the graduate with no future". Two-
thirds of Egyptians are under 30, and each year 700,000 new graduates chase 200,000 
new jobs (Green). 
 
As Green states, high unemployment among young Egyptians was a major contributor to 
discontentment with the Mubarak regime.  The youth’s perception of hopelessness with the 
future was a major catalyst for change (Green).   
 Next, the second primary facilitator for revolution was technology as a fundamental 
tool, used by the youth, to assist the revolution.  Without technology, the Arab Spring might 
have had a drastically different outcome.  The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, in 
Tunisia, spread through Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and others, throughout the region to 
inspire others to rise against their oppressive regimes.  These social networks also allowed 
ordinary citizens to organize and unite effectively.  Social networks were the primary source 
of news for those under 35 in Egyptian society.  Leaders of the revolution used social media 
to combat misinformation from the government.  In his article on the role of technology in 
the Egyptian revolution, Zack Brisson states,  
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One leading organizer with the Democratic Front Party described how they turned to 
Facebook as a spin machine whenever the government provided an opportunity: 
‘When the security forces broke in our front door on January 26, we immediately put 
up a Facebook group to collect popular anger and let the media know’ (Brisson).   
 
Social media and mobile phones were essential to communicate and organize, and without 
those tools, the revolution would have collapsed.  Mobile phones were even used by the 
government to inform the citizens of the status of the revolution, and in an effort to protect 
them from street violence when possible (Brisson).   
 It is important to note the technology was merely a tool that facilitated the revolution, 
and not necessarily a cause.  Technology does have its limitations, and was not always used 
in support of the revolution.  It is well documented that the Egyptian government monitored 
online and mobile communications.  Like any other tool, it is in how it is used that 
determines its effectiveness.  Technology was used to organize a revolution, but was also 
used to oppress Egyptian citizens.  The government had used technology in the past to spy 
and monitor the activities of its citizens.  When the government was losing control of the 
revolution, it saw the need to disrupt the use of technology, further oppressing its citizens.  
Technology requires human intent, and that intent determines whether it is used in a 
beneficial or malicious manner.  This distinction became apparent during the beginning of 
regime change in Egypt (Brisson).   
 The third primary cause of the Egyptian revolution was its foreign policy.  This is the 
cause that will be the primary focus of this examination of post-revolutionary change in 
Egypt after the process of regime change is understood.  While this was not a new issue, it 
exacerbated the unstable situation.  Egypt has had a complicated and supporting relationship 
with Israel, and took a stance on Israeli-Palestinian relations that was contrary to the popular 
opinion of Egypt’s citizens.  This delegitimized the government, and made the Mubarak 
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regime seem like a puppet to western influences.  The populace wanted a government that 
represented them, and not one that seemed weak and influenced by those who were perceived 
as the enemies of the country.  This foreign policy, along with domestic policies of 
corruption and torture led to the populace uniting and bringing down the repressive Mubarak 
regime.  The Mubarak regime continued oppressive policies put in place under Nasser.  The 
regime accomplished this through the police, and in conjunction with unpopular policies, 
facilitated the environment for revolution (Green).   
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Part II: Revolution 
 Beginning in 2011, Egypt went through several regime changes in a short period of 
time.  On January 25th, 2011, protests erupted in Tahrir Square with over ten thousand 
protestors.  This day was later known as “The Day of Revolt” or “The Day of Rage.”  These 
protests were non-violent and targeted Hosni Mubarak’s government.  Thousands of citizens 
marched in downtown Cairo, headed towards the offices of the ruling National Democratic 
Party, the foreign ministry, and the state television. Similar protests were reported in other 
cities across the county.  These protests started as peaceful demonstrations, but eventually 
police forces clashed with demonstrators proclaiming “Down with Mubarak,” situated 
primarily in Tahrir Square.  Hours after these protests erupted, the interior ministry made an 
announcement blaming the Muslim Brotherhood for these demonstrations, a claim the 
Brotherhood vehemently denied.  The day ended with the Interior Minister saying three 
protesters and a police officer were killed during the anti-government demonstrations (Al-
Jazeera English).    
 The protests continued for the next several days.  On January 26th, a protester and a 
police officer were killed in central Cairo as anti-government demonstrators bombarded 
security forces with rocks and firebombs for a second day, according to witnesses.  The 
protestors started to get recognition internationally.  Specifically, the United States released a 
statement of support for the protestors.  The Arab League stated, “The Arab citizen is angry, 
is frustrated” (Al-Jazeera English). More protests and violence occurred on January 27th, with 
continued support by other countries in the region.  This is the first day that Facebook, 
Twitter and Blackberry Messenger services were disrupted in an attempt to stall the 
revolution (Al-Jazeera English).   
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On January 28th, known as “The Friday of Anger,” hundreds of thousands protested 
throughout Egypt.  Internet and mobile phone text message users in Egypt reported major 
disruption to services as the country prepared for a new wave of protests after Friday prayers.  
There were several prisons that were opened by the government to release prisoners in an 
effort to terrorize the protestors.  The army and more police were called out as well in a 
desperate attempt to contain the protests.  Mubarak made his first address that day, and 
promised to form a new government.  Mubarak dismissed his entire cabinet, but refused to 
step down as president.  At this point, Mubarak’s whereabouts were unknown.  In the 
following day, Mubarak appointed a vice president for the first time in his regime (Al-
Jazeera America).    
On February 1st, Mubarak made another statement saying he would not run for 
another term and would make concessions in an effort to stop the protests.  He established a 
new cabinet and a new prime minister.  Mubarak promised reforms to the constitution, 
particularly Article 76, which makes it virtually impossible for independent candidates to run 
for office. He said his government would focus on improving the economy and providing 
jobs.  Protests continued for the next several days, with international support for the Egyptian 
citizens and praise for the Egyptian army.  The army remained deployed, and violence 
became more rampant and prevalent throughout the country (Al-Jazeera America).   
For the following week, protests continued, primarily in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.  
Differing reports are released on the amount of dead from the protests.  Changes continued to 
occur within the government, with Mubarak’s son leaving and a restructuring of the ruling 
party.  Reuters quoted Egyptian state TV as saying "terrorists" have targeted an Israel-Egypt 
gas pipeline in Northern Sinai.  The Muslim Brotherhood released a statement that it “has 
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decided to participate in a dialogue round in order to understand how serious the officials are 
in dealing with the demands of the people” (Reuters).  With protests getting worse, the 
Egyptian government received increasing pressure from external actors to end the revolution 
in an effort to protect the lives of Egypt’s citizens (Al-Jazeera America).   
On February 11th, after giving power to Vice President Omar Suleiman, Mubarak 
resigned, giving control of the government to the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed 
Forces (SCAF) (BBC News).  The country's new military rulers promised to hand power to 
an elected, civilian government and pledged that Egypt will remain committed to all 
international treaties.  This is in reference specifically to its 1979 peace treaty with Israel.  
Protestors celebrated in Tahrir Square for the following day, and then began to leave with the 
aid of the military.  Protestors did not leave Tahrir square empty for long.  Thousands 
returned protesting the police.  Police, ambulance drivers and other workers held separate 
demonstrations. The military leadership issued "Communiqué No 5", calling for national 
solidarity and criticizing strike action, and urging workers to play their role in reviving the 
economy (Al-Jazeera English). 
This swift transition in Egypt prompted uncertainty for relations between Israel and 
Egypt.  Israel was unsure if the status quo would remain the same, and struggled to establish 
communication with the new military led government.  The Israeli government released 
messages of support for the protestors, and was wary of increasing influence by the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  Because of this change in influence, the Israeli government did not want the 
status quo to change with Egypt, because it would ultimately lead to conflict.  With this 
region being so unstable, any change could have major repercussions (Sharnoff). 
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Part III: Regime Change 
The first regime change in Egypt came with the resignation of Mubarak and the 
taking of power by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces.  After taking power, SCAF 
dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution.  Following this, SCAF declared it 
will rule for six months or until general elections were held, whichever came first.  Shortly 
after, the Muslim Brotherhood announced it was recreating a political party, but was not 
seeking a candidate for the presidency.  Protests continued, however in smaller numbers, 
protestors pledged to keep protesting until all their demands were met.  On February 25, 
2011, the military violently dispersed a planned sit-in in Tahrir Square calling for the 
removal of Ahmed Shafik as prime minister.  Shafik resigned after being humiliated for 
being a member of the old regime by writer Alaa Al Aswany on Egyptian television. SCAF 
appointed former transportation minister Essam Sharaf as prime minister, on the reported 
recommendation of opposition activists during talks earlier that week (Irshad).  
Large protests continued to occur periodically protesting military trials of protestors, 
to stop SCAF from holding on to power indefinitely, and demanded trials of members of the 
Mubarak regime.  Throughout the protests, the military was actively trying to quell the 
uprising, resulting in many arrests.   Throughout March, SCAF, along with the interim 
government, passed resolutions to change the constitution and create an election process.  
Egyptian voters, through referendum, decided on a process of elections. However, shortly 
after, SCAF unilaterally issued a constitutional declaration establishing new rules for the 
formation of the Constituent Assembly with a privileged role for SCAF itself, rendering the 
verdict of the referendum irrelevant.  This lead to further protests in Tahrir Square, with 
protestors demanding the dissolution of the SCAF regime (Irshad).   
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Protests continued for the following months, due to the ineffectiveness of the SCAF 
government.  In June 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, headed by 
Mohammed Morsi, achieved legal status. Because of this, Islamists organized and began 
demonstrating.  On July 19th, tens of thousands packed Tahrir Square, after the first call by 
Islamist leaders for nationwide demonstrations since Mubarak was overthrown in February. 
Many protesters, mostly Muslim Brotherhood supporters, called for an Islamic state and 
Islamic law. In the earlier protests in Tahrir Square, liberal groups called for constitutional 
guarantees protecting religious freedom and personal rights, whereas Islamists demanded 
speedy elections and recognition of Islam in the new Egyptian system.  Egypt’s citizens 
continued to be dissatisfied by military rule and demanded change (Irshad).   
By mid-2012, there were Egyptian parliamentary elections, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the conservative Salafist Al-Nour Party won 
over 70 percent of seats in the People’s Assembly.  This seemed contrary to the liberal 
outcries during the beginning of the revolution.  However, the Islamists had the experience 
and organization to control parliament that the liberal and leftist parties could not match.  The 
Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission was created to ensure equity in the upcoming 
election.  Following their creation, the Commission disqualified ten controversial candidates, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood’s first candidate.  The Brotherhood was intent on 
obtaining the presidency, despite previous declarations (Irshad).   
In May, the first presidential elections were held since Mubarak stepped down from 
power.  Egyptian citizens chose between thirteen candidates in the first round of presidential 
elections. Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood received 5,764,952 votes, 24.8 
percent and previous Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik received 5,505,327 votes, 23.7 percent, 
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to advance to a runoff election.  Egyptians chose between Morsi and Shafik in the second 
round run-off election. This dissatisfied liberal voters, because there only choices were an 
Islamist or a member of the Mubarak regime.  Just as polls closed in presidential runoff 
voting, SCAF issued an interim constitutional decree that granted itself broad powers over 
the new government’s legislation, the national budget, and military affairs, without any 
oversight of its own activities.  This was seen as a soft coup, and a way for SCAF to step in 
to facilitate more regime change in the future (Irshad).  
By June 2012, Egypt had elected a new president, Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  Morsi was the first democratically elected leader in Egypt’s history.  After 
becoming president, Morsi began to enact new laws and policies.  A state of emergency law 
was enacted after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and was not lifted until two weeks after the 
2012 elections.  This marked a major turning point in Egyptian politics.  Many liberals 
believed that Morsi would enact strict religious laws, and those in the Muslim Brotherhood 
put their full support behind Morsi (BBC News).   
Morsi began his regime with several surprise decisions.  The first being a decree to 
reinstate the dissolved People’s Assembly, ordering that it carry out its function until another 
assembly was elected two months after the institution of a new constitution which was yet to 
be drawn up.  This was the first decision, of many, seen as Morsi’s attempt to usurp SCAF 
authority in the new Egyptian government.  However, this first decision did not last, because 
the Supreme Court ruled to suspend this Assembly once again.  Following this, Morsi 
ordered the release of 572 prisoners detained by the military during the SCAF-led transitional 
period after the January 2011 revolution.  In August 2012, Morsi appointed a prime minister, 
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Hisham Qandil, the Islamist-leaning minister of irrigation and water resources (El 
Sharnoubi).   
In August, Morsi continued to make decrees and resolutions that were impactful and 
surprising.  For example, after an attack by militants in the Sinai, Morsi fired Mubarak-
appointed intelligence chief Mourad Mouwafi, the governor of North Sinai, and various 
interior ministry officials.  This action further showed the Brotherhood’s willingness to 
eliminate any Mubarak supporters in the new government.  Following this move, Morsi 
issued a decree removing SCAF head and defense minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and 
army chief of staff Sami Anan, the second most important figure within the military council.  
Military Intelligence head Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi was appointed defense minister. The same 
decree reversed the SCAF declaration in June and amended the March 2012 constitutional 
declaration, thereby returning full executive and legislative power to the president and 
fundamentally weakening SCAF (El Sharnoubi). 
Following this substantial change, Morsi began building his new government, and 
attempted to appease as many groups as possible.  This entailed hiring aides and advisors 
who were Christians, liberals, Salafists and many members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  In 
September, Morsi spoke at the UN general assembly, giving a glimpse into his foreign policy 
changes.  Morsi stated Egypt’s position against the Syrian regime, highlighting the new 
"Islamic Quartet" initiative by Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran to find a solution for the 
Syrian crisis.  He also discussed his position on Israel, criticizing Israel for its settlements 
and hinted at the danger of Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal in his speech.  On his return to 
Egypt, Morsi declared there was no need to change the treaty created during the Camp David 
Accords of 1978.  In October, Egypt sent a new envoy to Israel delivering a letter to 
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President Shimon Peres.  The opposition initially criticized the sending of the letter, however, 
the Morsi regime claimed it was conventional diplomatic protocol. This gesture signaled a 
continuation of Egypt’s friendly relations with Israel under Morsi, a relationship Mubarak 
was repeatedly attacked for maintaining. In November, Morsi was praised by the US for his 
role in brokering a ceasefire between Hamas and the Israeli government after over a week of 
Israeli airstrikes and Palestinian rocket fire from the Gaza Strip that left over 160 dead 
(Jadaliyya). 
 Morsi continued to make bold foreign and domestic policy decisions that appeased 
the majority while being seen as going against his Islamist ideology. However, his decisions 
became increasing antagonistic and controversial.  He began to take control of the 
government in many ways that seemed dictatorial.  The opposition, many judges and 
prosecutors, and large sections of the Egyptian public were beginning to recognize a pattern 
that they had seen under Mubarak.  This pattern began with Morsi issuing a constitutional 
declaration, which put him beyond the bounds of judicial supervision.  This declaration 
protected the assembly creating the new constitution from dissolution.  The weeks that 
followed saw nationwide protests and several massive demonstrations in Tahrir Square, and 
at the presidential palace in Cairo. There were clashes between the president’s supporters and 
protesters, with hundreds of injuries and several deaths (Jadaliyya). 
 In December, the new Constitution was pushed through, although with a large amount 
of opposition and criticism.  Morsi called for a constitutional referendum, binding the 
Constituent Assembly to the deadline created in March 2011.  Morsi had promised to seek a 
balanced Constituent Assembly in his presidential campaign, a fact that antagonized the 
opposition further when he called for the referendum and described the new constitution as 
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“revolutionary.”  The opposition continued to defy Morsi and stated that the referendum be 
postponed.  Morsi ignored the opposition, and made a new declaration lifting his immunity 
from judicial oversight but kept the Brotherhood-dominated Constituent Assembly and Shura 
Council immune from dissolution.  The declaration also safeguarded the previous declaration 
that protected all constitutional declarations by the president from any challenges by court 
rulings in the future.  By December 26th, Morsi signed an executive order enacting the new 
constitution.  This was shortly after the Supreme Electoral Commission announced the draft 
constitution had been endorsed by 63.8 percent of voters (El Sharnoubi).   
 After the new constitution was enacted, Morsi continued to change the government 
more.  Morsi appointed ten new ministers, with eight members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
This went against public calls for a less partisan government.  January 2013 saw more 
protests against the Muslim Brotherhood dominated government.  In response, Morsi 
declared a state of emergency in three cities, imposing a nighttime curfew that was later 
defied by residents with no resistance from police or the army, who were deployed to secure 
the cities following the violence. Violence continued to increase throughout Egypt, and 
Morsi struggled to contain the unrest (El Sharnoubi).   
 Morsi’s government began to falter in February 2013, and lost key Islamist and 
Salafist allies.  Morsi held a national dialogue session to discuss upcoming parliamentary 
elections. Mainly Islamist groups attended the session while the opposition National 
Salvation Front boycotted the meeting, holding to its demands of dismissing the current 
government and calling for the postponing of the elections.  Morsi, without the support of his 
Islamist allies, announced parliamentary elections in April, but the Egyptian Administrative 
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Court overturned Morsi’s decree. Following this, Morsi stated parliamentary elections would 
be held in October (Jadaliyya). 
 Anti-Brotherhood sentiment was on the rise across Egypt. There were numerous 
attacks on Muslim Brotherhood offices and clashes between supporters and opponents of the 
president.   In June, an anti-Morsi signature campaign called Tamarod (Rebel) launched in 
May gathered significant momentum on the Egyptian streets. The group founded by the 
opposition attempted to force Morsi out of office by collecting 15 million petition signatures.  
Tamarod announced plans for a mass demonstration and sit-in at the presidential palace on 
the one-year anniversary of Morsi in office.  However, Morsi continued to appoint more 
Muslim Brotherhood members to the government, and continued making decisions that upset 
the opposition and non-Brotherhood Islamists.  With millions expected in Egypt's streets 
around the anniversary of the president's first term in office, many feared the meeting of rival 
protest groups would result in violence (El Sharnoubi). 
 A group of activists and members of the opposition notified the minister of defense 
that momentum for planned demonstrations calling for early presidential elections was 
picking up unprecedented support.  Egyptian intelligence estimated that no fewer than six 
million demonstrators would be at the demonstration. There was growing concern over 
potential confrontations with Islamists.  The opposition met with leaders of the Salafist Nour 
Party and shared concerns over extended political turmoil should the Muslim Brotherhood 
and President Mohamed Morsi’s decline to yield the opposition’s demands. However, Morsi 
continued to defy all who pled with him for change, and continued to antagonize all those 
who surrounded him (Jadaliyya).    
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Morsi’s final moments in power began with millions taking to the streets calling for 
his removal and the formation of a new government.   The Muslim Brotherhood insisted that 
it was not bowing to the demands of the street and declared the democratic right of the 
elected president to continue his term in office.  The minister of defense consulted with 
political advisors and issued a statement from the central command of the army that 
presented a 48-hour ultimatum to the president to bow to the demands of the opposition. 
Massive numbers of demonstrators took to the streets to celebrate. However, the president 
and the Muslim Brotherhood declined to submit to the opposition’s demands.  On July 3rd, 
Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi addressed Egypt and announced a substantial change 
for Egypt's political future proposed by the opposition, which included the ousting of Morsi 
and presidential elections.  The proposed changes included the temporary suspension of the 
current constitution, allowing the head of Egypt's High Constitutional Court to govern until a 
new president was elected by early presidential polls, putting in place checks to appease the 
opposition, and the removal of Morsi from office.  This removal was clearly a coup d’état by 
the leader of SCAF that Morsi put in charge of the armed forces  (El Sharnoubi).  
The army ousted Morsi on July 3, 2013, ushering in yet another regime change for 
Egypt.  The new leader of the interim government was Adly Mansour, who was the president 
of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt.  General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi facilitated the 
regime change and led the ousting of Morsi.  This was followed by a swift crackdown on 
Islamists, leading to arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, Morsi supporters, and shutting 
down of Islamist TV stations.  In Sisi’s speech announcing the change in government he 
stated, “The armed forces couldn’t plug its ears or close its eyes as the movement and 
demands of the masses calling for them to play a national role, not a political role as the 
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armed forces themselves will be the first to proclaim that they will stay away from politics” 
(PBS).  Morsi rejected Sisi’s claim that the army did not want to be involved in politics, and 
declared this an unlawful military coup.  This sudden change worried the Egyptian populace, 
because it seemed like the government was backsliding into what it was before the 2011 
revolution (Kirkpatrick, Hubbard, and Aljazeera America).   
 The swift regime change continued the turmoil in Egypt, mainly due to the changes 
facilitated by the interim government.  On July 4th, the new leader of the country, Adly 
Mansour, was sworn in to office. Mansour was a little-known judge who stated he looked 
forward to parliamentary and presidential elections that will express the “true will of the 
people.” Meanwhile, the government restricted Morsi from speaking and arrested hundreds 
of Brotherhood members.  On July 5th, Mansour dissolved the upper house of parliament in 
which Islamist parties had won a solid majority at the polls. This action led to violent clashes 
in Cairo and Alexandria resulting in several dead.  The antagonists in these clashes were pro- 
and anti- Morsi groups dissatisfied with the changes in government.  The violence continued 
through July 8th, culminating in the army opening fire on Morsi supporters in Cairo, killing 
over 50.  A military spokesman, contradicting dozens of witnesses who say the attack had 
been unprovoked, said the violence had started when Brotherhood members attacked the 
officers’ club of the Republican Guard (Hubbard and Fahim). 
 With violence and turmoil increasing day by day, the new government sought to have 
quick elections to bring some semblance of stability back to the country.  Interim 
president Mansour presented a timeline to amend the constitution and elect a new president 
and parliament by mid-February.  The Muslim Brotherhood continued to speak out against 
this, demanding that Morsi be reinstated.  The interim government reached out to other Arab 
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countries and publically recognized officials to bring legitimacy to the election process.  
However, due to its swift composition, the transition plan was criticized for being 
authoritarian and echoing the policies of Mubarak.  Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates pledged $8 billion in aid to Egypt to support the new transitional government and 
undermine Islamist groups vying for power in Egypt.  This ended the fuel and food shortages 
that were common under the Morsi regime (PBS and Kirkpatrick). 
 The new government made some surprisingly quick changes that led many to believe 
there was a campaign to undermine Morsi even before he was ousted.  The sudden end to 
energy shortages and the swift reemergence of the police caused many to believe that these 
shortages were devices created to weaken the Morsi regime and facilitate his removal.  The 
new government continued to spread information that suggested the Muslim Brotherhood 
had a campaign to incite violence and destabilize the country both before and after the 
removal of Morsi (Hubbard). 
 Egypt’s new interim government swore in a new cabinet on July 16, 2013.  Liberal 
and leftist politicians dominated the cabinet, completely leaving out Islamist and Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters from the cabinet.  The cabinet was more diverse than the one formed 
under Morsi, including three women and three Coptic Christians.  There were conflicting 
statements on whether or not the Islamists were intentionally not included.  The government 
maintained that it offered them positions, but the Brotherhood stated that the government was 
illegitimate and the Islamists were being purposefully repressed (Fahim).  
 Late July 2013 saw many more protests and clashes between Morsi supporters and 
opposition.  Millions of citizens poured into Egyptian streets after Sisi called on protesters to 
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give him a mandate to stop "potential terrorism" by Morsi supporters.  An independent 
journalist, Ashraf Khalil, commented on Sisi’s statements saying,  
The animosity against the Brotherhood is so intense that there really does seem to be 
a desire to just wipe them off the political playing field. And I’ve had conversations 
with people where their solution is, in Arabic translates to, ‘Just round them all up.’ 
… How do we function as a country when we’ve rounded up 15 percent of the 
dissidents? (PBS) 
 
There is clearly a disconnect between what Sisi was claiming, and what was actually 
occurring; however, it is difficult to determine the true motives of the interim government.  
The government continued to undermine Morsi by placing him under investigation for 
several allegations, including murder and conspiring with members of the Palestinian group 
Hamas to escape prison during the revolution in 2011 (Worth and Fahim). 
 Protests continued throughout July, culminating in a massive protest by Morsi 
supporters in front of the Rabaa Mosque in Cairo.  Egyptian military and police had 
threatened to break up the protests, despite a series of high-level meetings from the U.S. and 
Europe asking the military to hold off. Sisi had promised a humane dispersal.  On August 
14th, the security forces moved in on the protestors, killing at least 600 people and wounding 
thousands more. The attack, aided by snipers, lasted for more than 12 hours.  Following the 
violence, Mansour announced a return to martial law that existed under Mubarak, and 
imposed a curfew, worrying foreign actors of the return to the authoritarian government of 
Mubarak.  The Vice President, Mohamed ElBaradei resigned in protest of this new policy, in 
an attempt to bring to light Sisi’s abuses.  The United States canceled longstanding joint 
military exercises with the Egyptian Army set for September in an effort to condemn the 
actions of the government.  President Obama expressed outrage at the disturbing scenes 
occurring in Egypt, while taking pains to preserve the American relationship with the 
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Egyptian armed forces, which are supported by the $1.5 billion a year in military and 
economic aid (Fahim and Sheikh).   
 Despite foreign protests, government sponsored violence continued against the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  As August progressed, the country descended into anarchy with over a 
thousand dying in the streets.  Interim Egyptian Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi proposed 
the legal dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood, a move that could force the group back 
underground and usher in mass arrests of its members countrywide in an attempt to curb the 
rampant violence.  Following this, The Egyptian police arrested Mohamed Badie, the 
spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, a line the police had never crossed during 
Mubarak’s own crackdowns on the group, signaling that the government was willing to go as 
far as it could to eliminate the threat of the Brotherhood, specifically targeting religious 
officials.  A Brotherhood official commented on this stating, “We came close to annihilation 
once under Nasser, but this is worse” (Kirkpatrick and Sheikh).  This arrest signaled that 
most of the Brotherhood’s leadership was in the custody of the government, effectively 
crippling the group (Kirkpatrick and Sheikh).   
 With the Muslim Brotherhood growing weaker by the day in Egypt, several other 
judicial moves occurred in Egypt.  On August 22nd, Mubarak was released from prison, after 
a court ruled he could no longer be incarcerated.  He remained under house arrest, and faced 
charges of complicity in the killing of more than 850 protesters killed during the 2011 
revolution.  Morsi and 14 other members of the Muslim Brotherhood were charged for 
“committing acts of violence and inciting killing and thuggery” (PBS).  However, Islamists 
remain active and continued their course of violence throughout the country (Kirkpatrick and 
Nordland).   
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Violence continued among active, although illegal, Islamist organizations throughout 
the country.  Egypt’s Interior Minister and overseer of the police, Mohamed Ibrahim, 
survived a suicide car bomb that exploded near his motorcade. The attack was seen as 
retaliation for the aggressive government crackdown in recent weeks that has left more than 
1,000 Brotherhood supporters dead.  Mujahedeen’s Shura Council of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, 
a militant Islamist group claimed responsibility stating, “God allowed us to break the security 
system of the Minister of Interior … through a suicide operation committed by one of 
Egypt’s lions that made the Interior butcher see death with his eyes, and what is to come will 
be worse” (Saleh).   
By September, Sisi had gained a large amount of support from foreign and domestic 
influences.  Sisi claimed that he did not want to run, and the country did not need a general as 
president. However, his supporters suggested he did not have a choice in running, due to his 
influence over the ousting of Morsi.  Khaled Al Adawi, founder of Sisi’s campaign, stated, 
“The decision is not Sisi’s or the government’s, it is the Egyptian people’s decision. 
Presidency in Egypt is a commission, not an honorary position, so if Sisi doesn’t take the job 
when asked by the people, he will be putting himself in confrontation with the Egyptian 
people” (Bradley).  Sisi was seen as a clear frontrunner in any election, and was perceived to 
have the support of Egyptian citizens (Bradley).   
Egypt continued to be unstable throughout September.  The president’s office 
declared that the security situation in the country warranted a two-month extension of the 
state of emergency, which granted security forces extra powers.  On September 23rd, an 
Egyptian court banned the Muslim Brotherhood, forcing them underground.  All of the 
group’s assets were seized.  The interim government further showed that it did not intend to 
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fulfill its promises of a new, inclusive democratic process.  The Brotherhood commented on 
these actions saying, “We are part and parcel of the Egyptian society, and a corrupt and 
illegitimate judicial decision cannot change that” (Kirkpatrick).  The Brotherhood clearly 
wanted to remain in existence and planned to continue doing so in the manner it did for the 
85 years it operated in secrecy (Kirkpatrick).   
October saw the continuance of violence and disapproval of the interim government 
by foreign powers, specifically the United States.  On November 4th, Morsi went on trial, 
facing charges of inciting the murder of protesters, but he rejected the court’s authority and 
proclaimed himself to be the country’s legitimate ruler.  The trial was Morsi’s first public 
appearance since his removal from office on July 3rd and, in a worrying event for Egypt, the 
second criminal trial of a former head of state in less than three years, signifying the 
instability of the country (Sheikh and Kirkpatrick).  Violence and protests continued 
throughout the next month.  On December 24th, a bomb was detonated at police headquarters 
in Cairo.  It was Egypt’s deadliest bombing since militants began a campaign of 
assassinations and other attacks against security forces when Morsi was ousted.  This attack 
signified doubts with the government on their security ability.  This was especially 
worrisome for citizens planning on voting in an upcoming referendum on a draft constitution 
(Kareem and Sheikh). 
On January 18th, 2014, Egypt’s citizens voted on a referendum for a new constitution.  
The government announced that the charter passed with 98.1 percent of the vote.  This raised 
concerns from foreign observers over the legitimacy of the elections.  United States Secretary 
of State Kerry voiced his concerns stating, “The work that began in Tahrir Square must not 
end there” (Kirkpatrick).  This is referring to the strides for change during the 2011 
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revolution, and the need for those to be present in the new government. The new charter was 
not radically different from the Constitution drafted by an Islamist-led assembly and 
approved by a margin of almost two to one slightly more than a year before (Kirkpatrick).   
 In March, the government made more moves to eliminate Islamist opposition.  An 
Egyptian criminal court sentenced 529 people to death after a single session of a mass trial, 
convicting them of murder for the killing of a police officer in the city of Minya during riots 
the previous summer after the ousting of Morsi.  Another court in Cairo continued the trial of 
several journalists for Al Jazeera who were charged with broadcasting false reports of unrest 
in Egypt as part of an Islamist conspiracy to bring down the new government.  In May, 
Mubarak and his sons were convicted of embezzlement of millions of dollars of public 
money for their personal use in private homes and palaces.  Mubarak was sentenced to three 
years in prison and his sons for four years.  These legal actions were used to eliminate 
opposition before democratic elections in June (Kirkpatrick).  
 In June 2014, there was a pro forma election for a new president of Egypt.  General 
Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi won the election with 97 percent of the vote.  The election had a turnout 
of 47 percent of eligible voters. This small turnout indicated that the citizens of Egypt did not 
fully support Sisi.  Sisi had a monumental task ahead of him of overcoming the economic 
dysfunction and political polarization that plagued Egypt’s three-year experiment with 
democracy.  Foreign observers claimed that the election fell short of international standards, 
and the election was not truly equitable or democratic (Kirkpatrick).   
 Following the election, the government began to reshape and reestablish itself as a 
legitimate governing body.    The government issued a law regulating Egypt’s upcoming 
parliamentary elections. The law stated that the parliament would be comprised of 567 seats, 
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of which the President will elect 27. The remaining 540 will be distributed between 420 
members, to be elected individually, and 120 seats allocated to party lists.  Prime Minister 
Ibrahim Mehleb formed a new cabinet; the first one under Sisi’s rule. In the new government, 
the former ministry of information was dissolved, the ministry of urban development was 
established and the ministry of investment was split from the ministry of trade and industry 
(Daily News Egypt). 
 Throughout the rest of 2014, the government continued to make reforms and attempt 
to curb the violence that continued throughout Egypt.  Sisi instituted new policies to 
eliminate Islamist opposition, and attempted to allow the country to recover from the anarchy 
of the previous year.  Islamist groups continued to attack Egyptians in the Sinai and near the 
Libyan border.  New laws were put in place to protect military, vital, and public facilities 
from attacks.  The government also attempted to limit Hamas’s use of tunnels along the 
border with Gaza. By the end of the year, the government passed a law allowing them to 
dissolve terrorist entities, in an attempt to stop any further terrorist activity that occurs in the 
country.  One major terrorist entity was Palestinian group Hamas (Daily News Egypt).   
 In May 2015, ousted President Morsi was sentenced to death over a 2011 mass 
breakout of Muslim Brotherhood prisoners, along with more than 100 others. He was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison in April over arrest and torture of protesters during his 2012-
2013 time in office.  The Muslim Brotherhood claimed the charges were groundless.  
However, in June the courts upheld to sentence.  These were the final moments of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s time in power in Egypt.  This signified an end to the Islamist 
organization operating in the open and confirmed the deliberate dissolution of Islamist 
groups in Egypt (Kirkpatrick). 
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Part IV: Foreign Policy 
With Mubarak removed, the status of relations between Egypt and Israel were 
uncertain to say the least.  Egypt and Israel began their relationship with hostility in the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war.  This was followed by a 31-year state of war between the two countries 
until the Camp David Accords of 1978 after which the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was 
signed in 1979.  The peace treaty has lasted since the Camp David Accords, and for many 
years, Egypt has been a strong strategic partner.  The peace has not always been strong, but 
has lasted for over 30 years.  Overall, relations between the two countries were consistent up 
until the final months of Mubarak’s regime.  The leading Egyptian official with diplomatic 
ties to Israel, the head of Egyptian intelligence, was ousted with Mubarak; therefore the first 
challenge to Israel with regime change was establishing one of the very few diplomatic 
channels of communication with Egypt (Jewish Virtual Library).   
 With the ousting of Mubarak, a new era arrived for Egyptian and Israeli diplomacy.  
When Israel began to see the political unrest in Egypt and surrounding countries, the Israeli 
government grew wary.  Israeli policy officials stated that they were reminded of Tehran in 
1979, and were concerned about Israel’s security.  Daniel Byman, professor at Georgetown 
University, discusses Israel’s challenges at this time by stating,  
The new regimes and the chaotic regional situation pose security challenges to the 
Jewish state. These challenges, and the Israeli reactions to them, are likely to worsen 
the crisis in Gaza and make the prospects for peace between the Israelis and 
Palestinians even more remote (Byman, 123).   
 
Israel’s main concern was that the revolution did not turn violent.  If the revolution did turn 
violent, there was a very good chance that it would spill over Egypt’s borders and otherwise 
have negative consequences for Israel (Byman, 123-124).    
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 Mubarak had been a consistent partner for Israel.  While he was not a pioneer for 
peace, like President Anwar Sadat, he consistently maintained the peace treaty and shared the 
strategic goals of Israel.  One Israel analyst, Aluf Benn, described Mubarak’s relationship 
with Israel, “Israel has replaced eight prime ministers, fought several wars, and engaged in 
peace talks with multiple partners, and Mubarak was always there” (Byman, 124).  
Therefore, with the ousting of Mubarak, the status quo between Israel and Egypt was 
disrupted.  Israel was concerned about who would take power next, and what would happen 
with the long-standing peace treaty (Byman 124-127).   
 Not all officials saw the new regime change as negative.  Israeli President Shimon 
Peres, stated, “Poverty and oppression in the region have fed resentment against Israel and 
the better our neighbors will have it, we shall have better neighbors” (Berti, 134).  Above all 
else, Israel was fearful of Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, taking power.  The 
reason for this being that the Muslim Brotherhood had consistently opposed peace with Israel 
and would be the first to disrupt it. Any Islamist governments in the region were seen as 
negative in the view of Israel, because typically Islamists pursued the destruction of Israel 
and peace between Israel and any country in the region (Byman, 124-127).    
SCAF’s foreign policy needs to be analyzed.  On September 9th, 2011, several 
thousand protestors attacked an Israeli embassy in Cairo.  In response to this attack, the 
ruling military council decided to use the country’s emergency law to ensure safety.  During 
this crisis, the United States intervened recommending that Egypt honor its obligations to 
protect foreign diplomats in the country.  After this attack, Israel continued to work with the 
SCAF government, but relations were steadily becoming tenser, leading up to the 2012 
elections (Birnbaum and Greenberg).   
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After this attack, there were increased tensions between the temporary SCAF 
government, Egyptian protestors, and Israel (BBC News).  Egyptian soldiers getting killed 
during a raid by Israelis on the Egypt-Israel border also exacerbated these increased tensions. 
After SCAF ousted Mubarak and took power, Israel promptly attempted to obtain assurances 
by the new interim government that the peace treaty would not be altered.  Several days after 
the resignation of Mubarak, Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barak contacted Field Marshal 
Tantawi, the chief of SCAF, and obtained reassurances that the treaty would be upheld.  
Following this communication, SCAF decided to use the country’s emergency law to ensure 
safety (Berti, 133).   
 The threat of Islamists taking power around the region was a primary concern for 
Israel during the Arab Spring.  In the past, particularly with Iran, the rise of Islamists to 
power has caused many issues with Israel.  According to Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-
Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, “Islamist political forces have the best chance of gaining 
power” (Inbar, 62).  The rise of Islamist governments in the region meant there would be 
increased strains on the peace process with Israel.  Also, the influence of the United States, 
one of Israel’s biggest allies and advocates, declined rapidly as the Arab Spring continued.  
Inbar also comments that, “Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan are under great 
strain as anti-Israeli domestic forces in the respective countries, particularly the Islamists, 
become more influential and vocal” (Inbar, 63).  The rising power of Islamists posed a great 
threat to Israel in the region, and was pivotal in the future of Egypt-Israel relations (Inbar, 61-
64).   
 Next, During Morsi’s tumultuous time in office, his foreign policy had profound 
effect on relations with Israel.  In the 2012 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists 
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won two thirds of the seats in parliament.  This seemed to be one of the worst outcomes for 
an election in the eyes of Israeli politicians and analysts.  However, Israel’s government 
congratulated the new democratically elected government.  Subsequently, Israel was unable 
to open a clear channel of communication with the Islamists (Berti, 132-134).   
After some time, the Muslim Brotherhood affirmed the peace treaty.  The leadership 
discussed amending the treaty, but overall decided to uphold it, a decision that surprised 
many Israeli officials.  Morsi’s regime also helped slow down violence between Hamas and 
Israel.  Morsi did not prevent Israel from launching Operation Pillar of Defense, in which 
they attacked much of Hamas’ leadership and infrastructure in Gaza.  Morsi also ordered the 
army to crackdown on smuggling in the Sinai, and worked to close off tunnels to Gaza and 
fight off terrorists groups, such as Al-Qaeda and Hamas.   Morsi’s government was also 
outspoken as being anti-Iran, which allowed for increasing cooperation between the Egyptian 
government and Israel (Pfeffer).   
The Morsi regime’s opposition to Hamas is interesting to note.  Hamas is seen as the 
Palestinian counterpart to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.  Most in the region assumed the 
Islamist regime would support Hamas and join in opposition to Israel.  The opposition to Iran 
was not as much of a surprise due to the Brotherhood’s anti-Shia sentiments.  However, the 
adversarial treatment of Iran highlighted an important sectarian issue.  These foreign policy 
decisions ultimately had a detrimental effect on the Morsi regime (Pfeffer).   
The Morsi regime seemed to domestically participate in anti-Israel and anti-US 
rhetoric, but their foreign policy reflected something different.  When Morsi took power, he 
did not want to radically change foreign policy, and wanted to maintain strong ties to Israel, 
the US, and other partners in the region.   Morsi tried to appease public opinion by visiting 
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Iran, and supporting many Muslim Brotherhood ideals.  However, he endeavored to maintain 
the status quo diplomatically with many countries, especially Israel.  Any changes to Morsi’s 
foreign policy were seen mainly for appearances of his supporters, but overall Egyptian 
foreign policies remained the same.  Morsi wanted the status quo to remain the same, 
because any change would have catastrophic consequences.  The peace with Israel allowed 
Egypt to maintain some control over the region (Ezzat).   
After the military coup that removed Morsi from office, relations with Israel changed 
once again for Egypt. While Morsi was in office, Israel had been able to get the upper hand 
over Hamas, and had been able to get more support for the occupation of Gaza.  The military 
was in contact with Israel throughout Morsi’s regime, and now that they are in power, the 
situation was unlikely to change drastically.  None of Egypt’s leaders wanted to instigate 
hostility between them and Israel.  This is due to the political instability in Egypt, and 
hostility with Israel would only exacerbate the situation.  Public opinion was also against 
Hamas at this time, which lead to less opposition for peace with Israel.  Islamists are still in 
support of Hamas, but once the Morsi regime was ousted, Islamists have very little political 
clout (Scham).   
The Israel-Palestinian peace process is an integral part of relations between Israel and 
Egypt.  The peace process has been ongoing throughout the Arab Spring, and has been 
affected by political change in neighboring countries.  Many believed that peace talks 
between the Palestinians and Israel would change with the ousting of Morsi, but many did 
not know how that change would take place.  With violence and pressure from Hamas 
subsiding, many believed that the peace process might continue.  According to Paul Scham, a 
scholar at the Middle East Institute, “Morsi’s misfortunes could provide the impetus for 
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Palestinian reconciliation for the purpose of making peace. But for this to happen, Israel and 
the United States must be willing to play along and not simply rejoice in Hamas’s isolation” 
(Scham).  This statement indicates that the important players in the peace process needed to 
take advantage of the current situation and attempt to pursue peace in the region.  This 
opportunity was due largely to Morsi’s policies and the way he left office (Scham).   
 In early 2015, Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria group (ISIS) became very 
active, and presented many issues for the surrounding Arab countries.  In June, ISIS-
affiliated militants launched a massive assault on military positions in north Sinai, attempting 
to seize control of a small chunk of territory in Egypt. At least 17 Egyptian soldiers died, 
although some reports placed the death toll much higher.  ISIS mainly attacked targets in the 
Sinai in an attempt to seize control of territory strategically located near Israel.  The violence 
was encouraged by a crackdown on Islamists in Egypt, and ISIS has stated their support for 
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (Malsin).   
 In June 2015, Egypt opened the border between Gaza and Egypt, along with rumors 
that Hamas had quietly been carrying out negotiations with Israel, underscoring the extent to 
which Hamas has been operating independently from Palestinian Authority in governing 
territory.   Hamas' separate actions raised concerns that it was undermining Palestinian unity, 
considered necessary by many to gaining statehood.  Egypt was heavily involved with 
combatting Hamas and aided in the process of statehood talks between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority.  The government continued to try to eliminate terrorism through the 
next months.  However, the United States warned it would not be effective in eliminating 
terrorism if it cannot respect the civil rights of its own citizens (NYTimes).  
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 In September 2015, Israel, as part of effort to strengthen relations with Egypt's 
military-backed government, reopened its embassy in Cairo.  This reopening came four years 
to the day after the prior embassy was stormed during the 2011 uprising.   In October, 
smugglers in Palestinian city of Rafah saw the end to their illegal trade after Egyptian forces 
flooded tunnels in border areas along the Sinai.  Currently, only 20 of 250 tunnels are 
operational, diminishing Rafah's economy and raising concerns that floods will cripple 
significant Palestinian economic resources.  This latest effort to destroy tunnels is part of a 
crackdown by Sisi, who claims smugglers and militants use the tunnels, compromising 
Egypt’s security (Malsin). 
 Egypt’s foreign policy with Israel changed with the ousting of Morsi.  While relations 
were stable with Morsi, there were many concerns about the rise in power of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  When the army first took power after Morsi was ousted, the status quo seemed 
unlikely to change.  This was due to the fact that most of Israel’s contacts with Egypt were 
routed through the military, and since they were in charge, those contacts would remain.  Due 
to an increase in attacks in the Sinai, most Egyptians disapproved of Hamas, which was seen 
as the culprit for these attacks.  This led to less of a belligerent view of Israel, and a 
willingness to allow the government to work with Israel.  However, due to events in mid-
2014 between Israel and Palestine, Egypt quickly condemned Israel and sought to end any 
conflict that could potentially spill over into its borders.  Egypt wanted to support the efforts 
of the Palestinians and protect the lives of civilians that it saw were being threatened by 
Israeli military action (Scham). 
   With continuous support for Palestine, the Sisi administration officials supported the 
two-state solution establishing a Palestinian state on lands that were occupied in 1967.  The 
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Sisi administration quickly became critical of Israel during the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict.  
Egypt criticized this operation as “oppressive policies of mass punishment rejecting 'the 
irresponsible Israeli escalation' in the occupied Palestinian territory, which comes in the form 
of 'excessive' and unnecessary use of military force leading to the death of innocent civilians” 
(Yashar).  Egypt called for Israel to adopt self-restraint and to recognize that as an 
“occupation force”, it has a legal and moral duty to protect civilian lives.  Egypt became 
heavily involved in this conflict proposing an initiative for a ceasefire later accepted by 
Israel, but rejected by Hamas.  The Sisi administration urged the world to intervene and stop 
the crisis when it stated that its ceasefire efforts have been met with “obstinacy and 
stubbornness” (Yashar).   
 During the 2014 conflict, Egyptian officials had several meetings with Palestinian and 
Israeli officials.  These were held in Cairo in an effort to mediate and create a ceasefire.  Sisi 
also ordered the Egyptian Armed Forces to transport 500 tons of aid, which included food 
and medical supplies, to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. A statement was released by the 
military saying that Egypt is pursuing its efforts to stop the Israeli aggression on the Gaza 
Strip under Sisi’s supervision.  The conflict ended with an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire on 
August 26th. Egypt’s diplomacy of brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Palestine, cutting 
Hamas down to size, keeping Qatar and Turkey out of the equation and marginalizing the 
United States role made Egypt the largest beneficiary of the conflict.  This was seen as a 
major foreign policy success for the young Sisi administration, and laid the foundation for 
more foreign policy decisions to come (Yashar).   
 Sisi described the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict as a great chance to end the 66-year-old 
conflict calling Israel to reach a peace deal with the Palestinians saying “I call on the Israeli 
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people and the government: now is the time to end the conflict ... so that prosperity prevails, 
so that we all can have peace and security” (Your Middle East).  Sisi further stated that this 
conflict mainly stems from extremism, specifically referring to Hamas.  The situation in 
Palestinian controlled parts of Israel became an environment conducive to these 
organizations, and led to violence.  The Egyptian government promised that Egypt would 
guarantee Palestinians would not violate the peace treaty when reached expressing Egypt's 
willingness to deploy Egyptian observer forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Your 
Middle East).   
Egypt played a crucial role in mediating this conflict, and many agree that the 
resolution could not have been reached without their aid, and the work of Sisi.  However, the 
Sisi administration supported the Palestinian effort more than the Israeli forces.   They 
believed that the Israelis were the aggressors.  While not wanting to disrupt relations with 
Israel, Egypt wanted to make sure the Palestinian people were protected and sought the 
disruption of Hamas.  Egypt also wanted to remain the controlling power in the region 
through the mediation.  Qatar and Turkey also tried to be involved in the ceasefire, and if 
Egypt had failed, would have seized the opportunity to have influence in the region.  Egypt 
lost much of its influence during the previous tumultuous three years, and the Sisi regime is 
trying to restore Egypt to its former power and influence in the Arab world (Kingsley).   
One common theme throughout the Sisi administration’s foreign policy has been a 
condemnation for Hamas and other Islamist militant groups.  The Egyptian security 
establishment sees Hamas as inextricably linked to Egypt’s own issues of insecurity and 
instability.  Commenting on this, senior fellow at the Century Foundation, Michael Hanna 
states, “Egypt’s post-Morsi Gaza policy has been transparently ruthless, with the ultimate 
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aim of producing a politically docile and malleable Hamas in Gaza by exploiting internal 
divisions within the organization” (Hanna). The Islamist groups are portrayed as primarily to 
blame for the country and the region’s instability.  While it may seem that Hamas is not as 
much of a threat to Egypt as the government claims, the destabilization of Gaza does pose a 
threat.  The porous border between Gaza and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula has long served as a 
conduit for arms and militants.  Egypt has had a campaign undermine and weaken Hamas’s 
power for some time, but it has also been mindful of the limits of that policy due to 
Egyptians’ broad public sympathy for the Palestinian cause. However, many realize the 
inevitability of having to deal with Hamas as they gain more power in the Gaza strip 
(Hanna).  
One major challenge Sisi faced when dealing with Hamas was to not seem 
sympathetic to Israel. In Egypt, the majority of the public does not support Israel, and is 
heavily sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.  The Sisi regime wants to do what it can to 
eliminate Hamas, and realizes this is not possible without the cooperation from the Israelis.  
However, if the regime portrays too much cooperation or support for Israel, they will lose the 
support of the Egyptian public, and other allies in the region.  The Egyptian people will never 
support Israel, but the Sisi administration needs to retain the status quo of relations with a 
powerful strategic partner that is the only actor that can effectively cripple and ultimately 
eliminate Hamas (Hanna).   
From 2011 to 2014 the future of Egypt seemed uncertain.  While this is still true, 
Egypt is experiencing a semblance of stability for the first time in several years.  This is 
primarily due to the intense authoritarianism Sisi administration.  The regime is internally 
stable, a crucial aspect that was not part of any previous regime after the ousting of Mubarak.  
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Eric Trager, a fellow of the Washington Institute, comments on this stability stating,  “The 
various state institutions and civil groups that constitute the regime will likely remain tightly 
aligned for one basic reason: they view the Muslim Brotherhood as a significant threat to 
their respective interests and thus see the regime's crackdown on the organization as essential 
to their own survival” (Trager).  The Sisi regime does echo many of the authoritarian and 
repressive policies seen before the revolution.  However, due to the turmoil of the previous 
years, this is preferred over an inept regime that can descend into chaos at any moment -- but 
this was the perception by foreign allies, and not necessarily Egyptians (Trager). 
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Part V: Conclusion 
Due to the stability of the regime, Egypt has the perception of becoming stronger.  
However, this does not mean there is no dissent.  The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist 
groups speak out openly against Sisi. This does not seem to pose an immediate threat due to 
large economic and political support by those in favor, including both regional and global 
powers, of the current administration.  Although, dissent does continue to arise from 
Islamists and non-Islamists alike, which the Sisi regime endeavors to stop.  Many policies 
and the conduct of the government indicate a return to an Egypt similar to the one under 
Nasser.   The ruthless and harsh treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood allows the regime to 
pursue other interests undeterred.  These include foreign policy decisions with Israel and 
Palestine, and efforts in combatting the rise of ISIS and the Islamic State (Trager).  
Egypt’s future is worth monitoring in the coming years.  The Sisi administration 
remains stable at the moment.  If recent history is examined, it is clear that stability can wane 
quickly in Egypt.  In 2011, protestors sought to eliminate an oppressive military state that did 
not support its citizens and was extremely repressive.  In the following years, the country was 
torn apart by violence and oppression.  This culminated in the return of what can be argued 
as another military state.  While the military is not the ruling power as it was in between 
regime changes, the current ruler is a former general who has returned to some of the 
oppressive policies of Nasser and Mubarak.  Over four years, it can be argued that Egypt has 
come full circle.  The idealism and calls for change during the early days of revolution have 
disappeared out of necessity.  Violence, instead of peaceful protest and exchange of ideas, 
has become the motivator for change.  The regime’s prime focus is not to help its citizens, 
but rather to remain in power and eliminate any opposition.   
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The Arab Spring signaled a major disruption to the Arab region, and Egypt was one 
of the largest victims.  Beginning with protests and the ousting of dictator Hosni Mubarak in 
2011, several regime changes brought about violence, instability, and anarchy.  This 
culminated in a regime surprisingly similar to the one removed.  Egypt has once again risen 
out of anarchy, but is a shadow of its former influence and power.  The Arab world continues 
to be fraught with violence and extremism, with Israel stuck in the middle.  Israel has long 
relied on the support of Egypt.  With regime change came uncertainty in that support.  
However, Israel was never threatened by Egypt while change occurred, and each regime saw 
the importance of keeping Israel as a strategic partner.  This did not stop anti-Israel rhetoric, 
but foreign policy remained consistent.  The future of the Arab World is uncertain, and 
change is inevitable.  The future of Egypt will be determined by the actions of its 
government, and the willingness of its citizens to strive for change.     
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